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How do we navigate a deeply structured world? Why are you reading this sentence ﬁrst – and did you actually
look at the ﬁfth word? This review oﬀers some answers by appealing to active inference based on deep temporal
models. It builds on previous formulations of active inference to simulate behavioural and electrophysiological
responses under hierarchical generative models of state transitions. Inverting these models corresponds to se-
quential inference, such that the state at any hierarchical level entails a sequence of transitions in the level
below. The deep temporal aspect of these models means that evidence is accumulated over nested time scales,
enabling inferences about narratives (i.e., temporal scenes). We illustrate this behaviour with Bayesian belief
updating – and neuronal process theories – to simulate the epistemic foraging seen in reading. These simulations
reproduce perisaccadic delay period activity and local ﬁeld potentials seen empirically. Finally, we exploit the
deep structure of these models to simulate responses to local (e.g., font type) and global (e.g., semantic) vio-
lations; reproducing mismatch negativity and P300 responses respectively.
1. Introduction
In recent years, we have applied the free energy principle to gen-
erative models of worlds that can be described in terms of discrete
states in an attempt to understand the embodied Bayesian brain. The
resulting active inference scheme (for Markov decision processes) has
been applied in a variety of domains (see Table 1). This paper takes
active inference to the next level and considers hierarchical models
with deep temporal structure (George and Hawkins, 2009; Kiebel et al.,
2009; LeCun et al., 2015). This structure follows from generative
models that entertain state transitions or sequences over time. The re-
sulting model enables inference about narratives with deep temporal
structure (c.f., sequential scene construction) of the sort seen in reading.
In short, equipping an agent or simulated subject with deep temporal
models allows them to accumulate evidence over diﬀerent temporal
scales to ﬁnd the best explanation for their sensations.
This paper has two agendas: to introduce hierarchical (deep) gen-
erative models for active inference under Markov decision processes (or
hidden Markov models) and to show how their belief updating can be
understood in terms of neuronal processes. The problem we focus on is
how subjects deploy active vision to disambiguate the causes of their
sensations. In other words, we ask how people choose where to look
next, when resolving uncertainty about the underlying conceptual, se-
mantic or lexical causes of sensory input. This means that we are not
concerned with computational linguistics per se but the more general
problem of epistemic foraging, while using reading as an example.
Epistemics is at the heart of active inference, which is all about
reducing surprise or uncertainty, where uncertainty is expected sur-
prise. Technically, this means that one can describe both inference
(perception) and behaviour (action) in terms of minimising a free en-
ergy functional of probabilistic or Bayesian beliefs. In this setting,
variational free energy approximates surprise and expected free energy
approximates uncertainty (a.k.a. entropy). This single imperative pro-
vides an inclusive account of established (normative) approaches to
perception and action; for example, the principle of maximum mutual
information, the principle of minimum redundancy, formulations of
saliency as Bayesian surprise, risk sensitive or KL control, expected
utility theory, and so on (Barlow, 1974; Itti and Baldi, 2009; Kappen
et al., 2012; Ortega and Braun, 2013). Our focus here is on how subjects
use accumulated beliefs about the hidden states of the world to pre-
scribe active sampling of new information to resolve their uncertainty
quickly and eﬃciently (Ferro et al., 2010).
Our second agenda is to translate these normative (variational)
principles into neurobiology by trying to establish the construct validity
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of active inference in terms of behaviour and electrophysiological re-
sponses. We do this at three levels: ﬁrst, by highlighting the similarity
between the message passing implied by minimising variational free
energy and the neurobiology of neuronal circuits. Speciﬁcally, we try to
associate the dynamics of a gradient descent on variational free energy
with neuronal dynamics based upon neural mass models (Lopes da
Silva, 1991). Furthermore, the exchange of suﬃcient statistics implicit
in belief propagation is compared with the known characteristics of
extrinsic (between cortical area) and intrinsic (within cortical area)
neuronal connectivity. Second, we try to reproduce reading-like beha-
viour – in which epistemically rich information is sampled by sparse,
judicious saccadic eye movements. This enables us to associate peri-
saccadic updating with empirical phenomena, such as delay period
activity and perisaccadic local ﬁeld potentials (Kojima and Goldman-
Rakic, 1982; Purpura et al., 2003; Pastalkova et al., 2008). Finally, in
terms of the non-invasive electrophysiology, we try to reproduce the
well-known violation responses indexed by phenomena like the mis-
match negativity (MMN) and P300 waveforms in event related poten-
tial research (Strauss et al., 2015).
This paper comprises four sections. The ﬁrst (Active inference and
free energy) brieﬂy reviews active inference, establishing the normative
principles that underlie action and perception. The second section
(Belief propagation and neuronal networks) considers action and per-
ception, paying special attention to hierarchical generative models and
how the minimisation of free energy could be implemented in the brain.
The third section (Simulations of reading) introduces a particular gen-
erative model used to simulate reading and provides an illustration of
the ensuing behaviour – and simulated electrophysiological responses.
The ﬁnal section (Simulations of classical violation responses) rehearses
the reading simulations using diﬀerent prior beliefs to simulate re-
sponses to violations at diﬀerent hierarchical levels in the model.
2. Active inference and free energy
Active inference rests upon a generative model that is used to infer
the most likely causes of observable outcomes in terms of expected
states of the world. A generative model is just a probabilistic speciﬁ-
cation of how consequences (outcomes) follow from causes (states).
These states are called latent or hidden because they can only be in-
ferred through observations. Clearly, observations depend upon action
(e.g., where you are looking). This requires the generative model to
represent outcomes under diﬀerent actions or policies. Technically,
expectations about (future) outcomes and their hidden causes are op-
timised by minimising variational free energy, which renders them the
most likely (posterior) expectations about the (future) states of the
world, given (past) observations. This follows because the variational
free energy is an upper bound on (negative) log Bayesian model evi-
dence; also known as surprise, surprisal or self-information (Dayan
et al., 1995). Crucially, the prior probability of each policy (i.e., action
or plan) is the free energy expected under that policy (Friston et al.,
2015). This means that policies are more probable if they minimise
expected surprise or resolve uncertainty.
Evaluating the expected free energy of plausible policies – and im-
plicitly their posterior probabilities – enables the most likely action to
the selected. This action generates a new outcome and the cycle of
perception and action starts again. The resulting behaviour represents a
principled sampling of sensory cues that has epistemic, uncertainty
reducing and pragmatic, surprise reducing aspects. The pragmatic as-
pect follows from prior beliefs or preferences about future outcomes
that makes some outcomes more surprising than others. For example, I
would not expect to ﬁnd myself dismembered or humiliated – and
would therefore avoid these surprising state of aﬀairs. On this view,
behaviour is dominated by epistemic imperatives until there is no fur-
ther uncertainty to resolve. At this point pragmatic (prior) preferences
predominate, such that explorative behaviour gives way to exploitative
behaviour. In this paper, we focus on epistemic behaviour and only use
prior preferences to establish a task or instruction set. Namely, to report
a categorical decision when suﬃciently conﬁdent; i.e., under the prior
belief one does not make mistakes.
2.1. Hierarchical generative models
We are concerned here with hierarchical generative models in
which the outcomes of one level generate the hidden states at a lower
level. Fig. 1 provides a schematic of this sort of model. Outcomes de-
pend upon hidden states, while hidden states unfold in a way that
Table 1
Applications of active inference for Markov decision processes.
Application Comment References
Decision making under uncertainty Initial formulation of active inference for Markov decision processes
and sequential policy optimisation
(Friston et al., 2012b)
Optimal control (the mountain car problem) Illustration of risk sensitive or KL control in an engineering benchmark (Friston et al., 2012a)
Evidence accumulation: Urns task Demonstration of how beliefs states are absorbed into a generative
model
(FitzGerald et al., 2015b,c)
Addiction Application to psychopathology (Schwartenbeck et al., 2015c)
Dopaminergic responses Associating dopamine with the encoding of (expected) precision
provides a plausible account of dopaminergic discharges
(Friston et al., 2014 ; FitzGerald
et al., 2015a)
Computational fMRI Using Bayes optimal precision to predict activity in dopaminergic
areas
(Schwartenbeck et al., 2015a)
Choice preferences and epistemics Empirical testing of the hypothesis that people prefer to keep options
open
(Schwartenbeck et al., 2015b)
Behavioural economics and trust games Examining the eﬀects of prior beliefs about self and others (Moutoussis et al., 2014)
Foraging and two step mazes Formulation of epistemic and pragmatic value in terms of expected
free energy
(Friston et al., 2015)
Habit learning, reversal learning and devaluation Learning as minimising variational free energy with respect to model
parameters – and action selection as Bayesian model averaging
(FitzGerald et al., 2014; Friston
et al., 2016)
Saccadic searches and scene construction Mean ﬁeld approximation for multifactorial hidden states, enabling
high dimensional beliefs and outcomes: c.f., functional segregation
(Friston and Buzsaki, 2016;
Mirza et al., 2016)
Electrophysiological responses: place-cell activity, omission related
responses, mismatch negativity, P300, phase-procession, theta-
gamma coupling
Simulating neuronal processing with a gradient descent on variational
free energy; c.f., dynamic Bayesian belief propagation based on
marginal free energy
In press
Structure learning, sleep and insight Inclusion of parameters into expected free energy to enable structure
learning via Bayesian model reduction
Under review
Narrative construction and reading Hierarchical generalisation of generative model with deep temporal
structure
Current paper
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depends upon a sequence of actions or a policy. The generative model is
speciﬁed by two sets of matrices (or arrays). The ﬁrst set A i m( , ), maps
from hidden states to the m-th outcome or modality at the i-th level; for
example, exteroceptive (e.g., visual) or proprioceptive (e.g., eye posi-
tion) observations. The second set: uB ( )i n( , ) , prescribes the transitions
among the n-th hidden state or factor, at the i-th level, under action u.
Hidden factors correspond to diﬀerent states of the world, such as the
location (i.e., where) and category (i.e., what) of an object. Hierarchical
levels are linked by D i n( , ) that play a similar role to A i m( , ). However,
instead of mapping from hidden states to outcomes they map from
hidden states at the given level to the initial states of the n-th factor at
the level below. A more detailed description of these parameters can be
found in Table 2 and the Appendix. For simplicity, Fig. 1 assumes there
is a single hidden factor and outcome modality.
The generative model in Fig. 1 generates outcomes in the following
way: ﬁrst, a policy (action or plan) is selected at the highest level using
a softmax function of their expected free energies. Sequences of hidden
states are then generated using the probability transitions speciﬁed by
the selected policy (encoded in B matrices). These hidden states gen-
erate outcomes and initial hidden states in the level below (according to
A and Dmatrices). In addition, hidden states can inﬂuence the expected
free energy (through C matrices) and therefore inﬂuence the policies
that determine transitions among subordinate states. The key aspect of
this generative model is that state transitions proceed at diﬀerent rates
at diﬀerent levels of the hierarchy. In other words, the hidden state at a
particular level entails a sequence of hidden states at the level below.
This is a necessary consequence of conditioning the initial state at any
level on the hidden states in the level above. Heuristically, this hier-
archical model generates outcomes over nested timescales; like the
second-hand of a clock that completes a cycle for every tick of the
minute-hand that, in turn precesses more quickly than the hour hand. It
is this particular construction that lends the generative model a deep
temporal architecture. In other words, hidden states at higher levels
contextualise transitions or trajectories of hidden states at lower levels;
generating a deep dynamic narrative.
2.2. Variational free energy and inference
For any given generative model, active inference corresponds to
optimising expectations of hidden states and policies with respect to
variational free energy. These expectations constitute the suﬃcient
statistics of posterior beliefs, usually denoted by the probability dis-
tribution Q s π( , )͠ , where s π( , )͠ are hidden or unknown states and po-
licies. This optimisation can be expressed mathematically as:
Fig. 1. Generative model and (approximate) posterior. Left panel: these equations specify the generative model. A generative model is the joint probability of
outcomes or consequences and their (latent or hidden) causes, see top equation. Usually, the model is expressed in terms of a likelihood (the probability of con-
sequences given causes) and priors over causes. When a prior depends upon a random variable it is called an empirical prior. Here, the likelihood is speciﬁed by an
array A whose elements are the probability of an outcome under every combination of hidden states. The empirical priors pertain to probabilistic transitions (in the B
arrays) among hidden states that can depend upon action, which is determined probabilistically by policies (sequences of actions encoded by π). The key aspect of
this generative model is that policies are more probable a priori if they minimise the (path integral of) expected free energy G, which depends upon our prior
preferences about outcomes encoded by the array C. Finally, the D arrays speciﬁed the initial state, given the state of the level above. This completes the speciﬁcation
of the model in terms of parameter arrays that constitute A–D. Bayesian model inversion refers to the inverse mapping from consequences to causes; i.e., estimating
the hidden states and other variables that cause outcomes. In variational Bayesian inversion, one has to specify the form of an approximate posterior distribution,
which is provided in the lower panel. This particular form uses a mean ﬁeld approximation, in which posterior beliefs are approximated by the product of marginal
distributions over hierarchical levels and points in time. Subscripts index time (or policy), while (bracketed) superscripts index hierarchical level. See the main text
and Table 2 for a detailed explanation of the variables (italic variables represent hidden states, while bold variables indicate expectations about those states). Right
panel: this Bayesian graph represents the conditional dependencies among hidden states and how they cause outcomes. Open circles are random variables (hidden
states and policies) while ﬁlled circles denote observable outcomes. The key aspect of this model is its hierarchical structure that represents sequences of hidden
states over time or epochs. In this model, hidden states at higher levels generate the initial states for lower levels – that then unfold to generate a sequence of
outcomes: c.f., associative chaining (Page and Norris, 1998). Crucially, lower levels cycle over a sequence for each transition of the level above. This is indicated by
the variables outlined in red, which are ‘reused’ as higher levels unfold. It is this scheduling that endows the model with deep temporal structure. Note that hidden
states at any level can generate outcomes and hidden states at the lower level. Furthermore, the policies at each level depend upon the hidden states of the level above
– and are in play for the sequence of state transitions at the level below. This means that hidden states can inﬂuence subordinate states in two ways: by specifying the
initial states – or via policy-dependent state transitions. Please see main text and Table 2 for a deﬁnition of the variables. For clarity, time subscripts have been
omitted from hidden states at level i + 1 (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article).
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(1)
where = …o o o( , , )͠ t1 denotes observations up until the current time
point and = …s s s( , , )͠ T1 represents hidden states over all the time points
in a sequence. Because the (KL) divergence between a subject’s beliefs
and the true posterior cannot be less than zero, the penultimate equality
means that free energy is minimised when the two are the same. At this
point, the free energy becomes the surprise or negative log evidence for
the generative model (Beal, 2003). In other words, minimising free
energy is equivalent to minimising the complexity of accurate ex-
planations for observed outcomes.
In active inference, both beliefs and action minimise free energy.
However, beliefs cannot aﬀect outcomes. This means that action aﬀords
the only means of minimising surprise, where action minimises ex-
pected free energy; i.e. expected surprise or uncertainty. In turn, this
rests on equipping subjects with the prior beliefs that their policies will
minimise expected free energy (Friston et al., 2015):
(2)
Here, G π τ( , ) denotes the expected free energy of a particular policy at
a particular time, and = =
∼
Q Q o s π P o s Q s π( , ) ( ) ( )τ τ τ τ τ is the
predictive distribution over hidden states and outcomes under that
policy. Comparing the expressions for expected free energy (Eq. (2))
with variational free energy (Eq. (1)), we see that the (negative) di-
vergence becomes epistemic value and the log evidence becomes expected
value – provided we associate the prior preference over future outcomes
with value. In other words, valuable outcomes are those we expect to
encounter and costly outcomes are surprising (e.g., being in pain). The
last equality provides a complementary interpretation; in which com-
plexity becomes risk, and inaccuracy becomes ambiguity. Please see the
appendices for derivations.
There are several special cases of expected free energy that appeal to
(and contextualise) established constructs. For example, maximising
epistemic value is equivalent to maximising (expected) Bayesian sur-
prise (Itti and Baldi, 2009), where Bayesian surprise is the divergence
between posterior and prior beliefs. This can also be interpreted as the
principle of maximum mutual information or minimum redundancy
(Barlow, 1961; Linsker, 1990; Olshausen and Field, 1996; Laughlin,
2001). In this context, epistemic value is the expected mutual informa-
tion between future states and their consequences, which is also known
as information gain. Because epistemic value (i.e., mutual information)
cannot be less than zero, it disappears when the (predictive) posterior
ceases to be informed by new observations. This means epistemic be-
haviour will search out observations that resolve uncertainty (e.g.,
foraging to ﬁnd a prey or turning on the light in a dark room). However,
when the agent is conﬁdent about the state of the world, there can be no
further information gain and pragmatic (prior) preferences dominate.
Crucially, epistemic and expected values have a deﬁnitive quantitative
relationship, which means there is no need to adjudicate between ex-
plorative, epistemic uncertainty reducing and exploitative, pragmatic
goal directed behaviour. The switch between behavioural policies
emerges naturally from minimising expected free energy. This switch
depends on the relative contribution of epistemic and expected value,
thereby resolving the exploration-exploitation dilemma. Furthermore,
in the absence of any precise preferences, purposeful behaviour is
purely epistemic in nature. In what follows, we will see that prior
preferences or goals are usually restricted to the highest levels of a
hierarchy. This means that active inference at lower levels is purely
uncertainty reducing, where action ceases when uncertainty ap-
proaches zero (in this paper, a sequence of actions terminates when the
Table 2
Glossary of expressions (for the i-th hierarchical level of a generative model).
Expression Description
∈ ∈o {0, 1}τi m D i m( , ) ( , ) Outcomes in M modalities at each time point, taken to be ‘one-in-K’ vectors of dimension D(i,m)
= …o o o( , , )͠ i m i m t i m( , ) 1
( , ) ( , ) Sequences of outcomes until the current time point


∈ ∈
∈ ∈
s
s
{0, 1}
[0, 1]
τ
i n D i n
π τ
i n D i n
( , ) ( , )
,
( , ) ( , )
Hidden states of the n-th factor at each time point and their posterior expectations under each policy
= …s s s( , , )͠ i n i n T
i n( , )
1
( , ) ( , ) Sequences of hidden states until the end of the current sequence


∈ … ∈
= … ∈ ∈
π K
π π π
{1, , }
( , , ) [0, 1]
i
i i
K
i K
( )
( )
1
( ) ( )
Sequential policies specifying controlled transitions within N hidden factors over time and their posterior expectations
= ∈u π t n( , )π τi n i,( , ) ( ) Action or control variables for the n-th factor of hidden states at a particular time speciﬁed by a policy
= −
= −σ
ν s
s ν
ln
( )
π τ
i n
π τ
i n
π τ
i n
π τ
i n
,
( , )
,
( , )
,
( , )
,
( , )
Auxiliary (depolarisation) variable corresponding to the surprise of an expected state – a softmax function of depolarisation
= ∘ …o A s s( , )π τi m i m π τi π τi,( , ) ( , ) ,( ,1) ,( ,2) Predictive posterior over future outcomes using a generalised dot product (sum of products) operator
= ∑ ⋅s π sτi n π π
i
π τ
i n( , ) ( )
,
( , ) Bayesian model average of hidden states over policies
∈ ∈ × × …A [0, 1]i m D i m D i D i( , ) ( , ) ( ,1) ( ,2) Likelihood tensor mapping from hidden states to the m-th modality
≜ ∈ ∈ ×uB B ( ) [0, 1]π τi n i n π τi n D i n D i n,( , ) ( , ) ,( , ) ( , ) ( , ) Transition probability for the n-th hidden state under an action (prescribed by a policy at a particular time)
∈ ∈ × +C [0, 1]τi m D i m D i n( , ) ( , ) ( 1, ) Prior probability of the m-th outcome at the i-th level conditioned on the n-th (hierarchical) context
≜ ∈ ∈ × +D B [0, 1]i n πi n D i n D i n( , ) ,0( , ) ( , ) ( 1, ) Prior probability of the n-th initial state at the i-th level conditioned on the n-th (hierarchical) context
= … ∈F F F( , , )i i Ki K( ) 1( ) ( ) Marginal free energy for each policy
= … ∈G G G( , , )i i Ki K( ) 1( ) ( ) Expected free energy for each policy
= −∑ ∈… … …H A Alnkli m j jkl
i m
jkl
i m( , ) ( , ) ( , ) Entropy of outcomes under each combination of states in the m-th modality
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uncertainty about states prescribed by higher levels is 1
64
nats or less).
2.3. Summary
Minimising expected free energy is essentially the same as avoiding
surprises and resolving uncertainty. This resolution of uncertainty is
closely related to satisfying artiﬁcial curiosity (Schmidhuber, 1991; Still
and Precup, 2012) and speaks to the value of information (Howard,
1966). Expected free energy can be expressed in terms of epistemic and
expected value – or in terms of risk and ambiguity. The expected
complexity or risk is exactly the same quantity minimised in risk sen-
sitive or KL control (Klyubin et al., 2005; van den Broek et al., 2010),
and underpins related (free energy) formulations of bounded rationality
based on complexity costs (Braun et al., 2011; Ortega and Braun, 2013).
In other words, minimising expected complexity renders behaviour
risk-sensitive, while maximising expected accuracy induces ambiguity-
resolving behaviour. In the next section, we look more closely at how
this minimisation is implemented.
3. Belief propagation and neuronal networks
Having deﬁned a generative model, the expectations encoding
posterior beliefs (and action) can be optimised by minimising varia-
tional free energy. Fig. 2 provides the mathematical expressions for this
optimisation or belief updating. Although the updates look a little
complicated, they are remarkably plausible in terms of neurobiological
process theories (Friston et al., 2014). In brief, minimising variational
free energy means that expectations about allowable policies become a
softmax function of variational and expected free energy, where the
(path integral) of variational free energy scores the evidence that a
particular policy is being pursued (Equation 1.c in Fig. 2). Conversely,
the expected free energy plays the role of a prior over policies that
reﬂect their ability to resolve uncertainty (Equation 1.d). The resulting
policy expectations are used to predict the state at each level in the
form of a Bayesian model average; in other words, the expected states
under each policy are combined in proportion to the expected prob-
ability of each policy (Equation 2.d). These Bayesian model averages
then provide (top-down) prior constraints on the initial states of the
level below. Finally, expectations about policies enable the most likely
action to be selected at each level of the hierarchy. Fig. 2 only shows
action selection for the lowest (ﬁrst) level.
Of special interest here, are the updates for expectations of hidden
states (for each policy and time). These have been formulated as a
gradient descent on variational free energy (see Appendix 1). This
furnishes a dynamical process theory that can be tested against em-
pirical measures of neuronal dynamics. Speciﬁcally, the Bayesian up-
dating or belief propagation (see Appendix 2) has been expressed so
that it can be understood in terms of neurophysiology. Under this in-
terpretation, expected states are a softmax function of log expectations
that can be associated with neuronal depolarisation (Equation 2.b). In
other words, the softmax function becomes a ﬁring rate function of
depolarisation, where changes in postsynaptic potential are caused by
currents induced by presynaptic input from prediction error units
(Equation 2.a). In this formulation, state prediction errors are the dif-
ference between the log expected state and its prediction from observed
outcomes, the preceding state and subsequent state (Equation 1.a). Si-
milarly, outcome prediction errors are the diﬀerence between the log
expected outcome and the outcome predicted by hidden states in the
level above (Equation 1.b). Physiologically, this means that when state
prediction error unit activity is suppressed, there is no further depo-
larisation of expectation units and their ﬁring attains a variational free
energy minimum. This suggests that for every expectation unit there
should be a companion error unit, whose activity is the rate of change
of depolarisation of the expectation unit; for example, excitatory (ex-
pectation) pyramidal cells and fast spiking inhibitory (error) inter-
neurons (Sohal et al., 2009; Cruikshank et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013).
3.1. Extrinsic and intrinsic connectivity
The graphics in Fig. 2 have assigned various expectations and errors
to neuronal populations in speciﬁc cortical layers. This (speculative)
assignment, allows one to talk about the functional anatomy of extrinsic
and intrinsic connectivity in terms of belief propagation. In brief, the
mathematical form of Bayesian belief updating tells us which neuronal
representations talk to each other. For example, in a hierarchical set-
ting, the only suﬃcient statistics that are exchanged between levels are
the Bayesian model averages of expected states. This means, by deﬁ-
nition, that the Bayesian model averages must be encoded by principal
cells that send neuronal connections to other areas in the cortical
hierarchy. These are the superﬁcial and deep pyramidal cells show in
red in Fig. 2. Next, we know that the targets of ascending extrinsic
(feedforward) connections from superﬁcial pyramidal cells are the
spiny stellate cells in Layer 4 (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Bastos
et al., 2012; Markov et al., 2013). The only suﬃcient statistics in receipt
of Bayesian model averages from the level below are policy-speciﬁc
expectations about hidden states. These can be associated with spiny
stellate cells (upper cyan layer in Fig. 2). These suﬃcient statistics are
combined to form the Bayesian model average in superﬁcial pyramidal
cells, exactly as predicted by quantitative connectivity studies of the
canonical cortical microcircuit (Thomson and Bannister, 2003). One
can pursue this game and – with some poetic license – reproduce the
known quantitative microcircuitry of inter-and intralaminar connec-
tions. Fig. 3 illustrates one solution that reproduces not only the major
intrinsic connections but also their excitatory and inhibitory nature.
This arrangement suggests that inhibitory interneurons play the role of
error units (which is consistent with the analysis above), while policy-
speciﬁc expectations are again encoded by excitatory neurons in Layer
4. Crucially, this requires a modulatory weighting of the intrinsic
feedforward connections from expectation units to their Bayesian
model averages in the superﬁcial layers. This brings us to extrinsic
connections and the neuronal encoding of policies in the cortico-basal
ganglia-thalamic loops.
3.2. Extrinsic connectivity and cortico-subcortical loops
According to the belief propagation equations, expected policies rest
upon their variational and expected free energy. These free energies
comprise (KL) divergences that can always be expressed in terms of an
average prediction error. Here, the variational free energy is the ex-
pected state prediction error, while the expected free energy is the
expected outcome prediction error. These averages are gathered over
all policies and time points within a hierarchical level and are passed
through a sigmoid (softmax) function to produce policy expectations. If
we associate this pooling with cortico-subcortical projections to the
basal ganglia – and the subsequent Bayesian model averaging with
thalamocortical projections to the cortex – there is a remarkable cor-
respondence between the implicit connectivity (both in terms of its
speciﬁcity and excitatory versus inhibitory nature) and the connectivity
of the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical loops.
The schematic in Fig. 4 is based upon the hierarchical anatomy of
cortico-basal ganglia-thalamic loops described in (Jahanshahi et al.,
2015). If one subscribes to this functional anatomy, the formal message
passing of belief propagation suggests that competing low level (motor
executive) policies are evaluated in the putamen; intermediate (asso-
ciative) policies in the caudate and high level (limbic) policies in the
ventral striatum. These representations then send (inhibitory or GA-
BAergic) projections to the globus pallidus interna (GPi) that encodes
the expected (selected) policy. These expectations are then commu-
nicated via thalamocortical projections to superﬁcial layers encoding
Bayesian model averages. From a neurophysiological perspective, the
best candidate for the implicit averaging would be matrix thalamo-
cortical circuits that "appear to be specialized for robust transmission
over relatively extended periods, consistent with the sort of persistent
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activation observed during working memory and potentially applicable
to state-dependent regulation of excitability" (Cruikshank et al., 2012).
This deep temporal hierarchy is apparent in hierarchically structured
cortical dynamics – invasive recordings in primates suggest an ante-
roposterior gradient of spontaneous ﬂuctuation time constants con-
sistent with the architecture in Fig. 4 (Kiebel et al., 2008; Murray et al.,
2014). Clearly, there are many anatomical issues that have been ig-
nored here; such as the distinction between direct and indirect path-
ways (Frank, 2005), the role of dopamine in modulating the precision
of beliefs about policies (Friston et al., 2014) and so on. However, the
basic architecture suggested by the above treatment speaks to the
biological plausibility of belief updating under hierarchical generative
models.
3.3. Summary
By assuming a generic (hierarchical Markovian) form for the gen-
erative model, it is fairly easy to derive Bayesian updates that clarify the
relationship between perception and action selection. In brief, the agent
ﬁrst infers the hidden states under each policy that it entertains. It then
evaluates the evidence for each policy based upon observed outcomes
and beliefs about future states. The posterior beliefs about each policy
are used to form a Bayesian model average of the next outcome, which
is realised through action. In hierarchical models, the implicit belief
updating (known as belief propagation in machine learning) appears to
rest on message passing that bears a remarkable similarity to cortical
hierarchies and cortico-basal ganglia-thalamic loops; both in terms of
extrinsic connectivity and intrinsic canonical (cortical) microcircuits. In
the next section, we use this scheme to simulate reading.
Fig. 2. Schematic overview of belief propagation: left panel: these equalities are the belief updates mediating inference (i.e. state estimation) and action selection.
These expressions follow in a fairly straightforward way from a gradient descent on variational free energy. The equations have been expressed in terms of prediction
errors that come in two ﬂavours. The ﬁrst, state prediction error scores the diﬀerence between the (log) expected states under any policy and time (at each
hierarchical level) and the corresponding predictions based upon outcomes and the (preceding and subsequent) hidden states (1.a). These represent likelihood and
empirical prior terms respectively. The prediction error drives log-expectations (2.a), where the expectation per se is obtained via a softmax operator (2.b). The
second, outcome prediction error reports the diﬀerence between the (log) expected outcome and that predicted under prior preferences set by the level above (plus an
ambiguity term – see Appendix) (1.b). This prediction error is weighted by the expected outcomes to evaluate the expected free energy (1.d). Similarly, the free
energy per se is the expected state prediction error, under current beliefs about hidden states (1.c). These policy-speciﬁc free energies are combined to give the policy
expectations via a softmax function (2.c). Finally, expectations about hidden states are a Bayesian model average over expected policies (2.d) and expectations about
policies specify the action that is most likely to realise the expected outcome (3). The (Iverson) brackets in Equation 3 return one if the condition in square brackets is
satisﬁed and zero otherwise. Right panel: this schematic represents the message passing implicit in the equations on the left. The expectations have been associated
with neuronal populations (coloured balls) that are arranged to highlight the correspondence with known intrinsic (within cortical area) and extrinsic (between
cortical areas) connections. Red connections are excitatory, blue connections are inhibitory and green connections are modulatory (i.e., involve a multiplication or
weighting). This schematic illustrates three hierarchical levels (which are arranged horizontally in this ﬁgure, as opposed to vertically in Fig. 1), where each level
provides top-down empirical priors for the initial state of the level below, while the lower level supplies evidence for the current state at the level above. The intrinsic
connections mediate the empirical priors and Bayesian model averaging. Cyan units correspond to expectations about hidden states and (future) outcomes under each
policy, while red states indicate their Bayesian model averages. Pink units correspond to (state and outcome) prediction errors that are averaged to evaluate
(variational and expected) free energy and subsequent policy expectations (in the lower part of the network). This (neuronal) network interpretation of belief
updating means that connection strengths correspond to the parameters of the generative model in Fig. 1. Please see Table 2 for a deﬁnition of the variables. The
variational free energy has been omitted from this ﬁgure because the policies in this paper diﬀer only in the next action. This means the evidence (i.e. variational free
energy) from past outcomes is the same for all policies (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
this article).
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4. Simulations of reading
The remainder of this paper considers simulations of reading using a
generative model that is a hierarchical extension of a model we have
used previously to illustrate scene construction (Mirza et al., 2016). In
the original paradigm, (simulated) subjects had to sample four quad-
rants of a visual scene to classify the arrangement of visual objects (a
bird, a cat and seeds) into one of three categories (ﬂee, feed or wait). If
the bird and cat were next to each other (in the upper or lower quad-
rants) the category was ﬂee. If the bird was next to the seeds, the cate-
gory was feed. Alternatively, if the bird and seeds occupied diagonal
quadrants, the category was wait. Here, we treat the visual objects as
letters and the scene as a word; enabling us to add a hierarchical level
to generate sentences or sequences of words. The subject’s task was to
categorise sentences of four words into happy or sad narratives; where
happy narratives concluded with a feed or wait in the ﬁnal two words.
Somewhat arbitrarily, we restricted the hypotheses at the second level
to 6 sentences (see Fig. 5). By stimulating reading, we hoped to produce
realistic sequences of saccadic eye movements, in which the subject
interrogated local features (i.e. letters) with sparse and informative
foveal sampling; in other words, jumping to key letter features and
moving to the next word as soon as the current word could be inferred
conﬁdently. Furthermore, because the subject has a deep model, she
already has in mind the words and letters that are likely to be sampled
in the future; enabling an eﬃcient foraging for information.
To simulate this sort of task, one needs to specify the hidden factors,
allowable policies and prior preferences. Fig. 5 illustrates the factor-
isation and hierarchical structure of the resulting model. At the highest
level there are three hidden factors (only two are shown in the ﬁgure
for simplicity). These comprise the sentence (with six alternatives), the
word the subject is currently examining (one of four words) and the
decision (undecided, happy or sad). The word location and current
sentence specify the hidden state (word) at the lower hierarchical level.
The lower level also includes a letter location state (one of four quad-
rants) and two spatial transformations (horizontal and vertical ﬂip). The
current word and letter location specify the outcome (letter or visual
object; cat, bird, seed or nothing). At both the higher (e.g., sentence) and
lower (e.g., word) levels, the hidden locations also specify a proprio-
ceptive outcome in terms of higher (e.g., head) and lower (e.g., eye)
movements that sample the word and letter respectively. Finally, the
hidden decision state determines (e.g. auditory) feedback with three
possibilities; namely, nothing, right or wrong. The decision state and
feedback outcomes have been omitted from Fig. 5 for clarity.
This setup deﬁnes the state space and mapping from hidden states to
outcomes encoded by the A parameters. Note that the likelihood
mapping involves interactions among hidden states; for example, one
has to know both the location being sampled and the word generating
outcomes before the letter is speciﬁed. These interactions are modelled
very simply by placing a one at the appropriate combination of hidden
states (and zeros elsewhere) in the row of A corresponding to the out-
come. Similarly, the D parameters specify the outcome in terms of
hidden states at the lower level in terms of (combinations of) hidden
Fig. 3. Belief propagation and intrinsic connectivity. This schematic features the correspondence between known canonical microcircuitry and the belief updates in
Fig. 2. Left Panel: a canonical microcircuit based on (Haeusler and Maass, 2007), where inhibitory cells have been omitted from the deep layers – because they have
little interlaminar connectivity. The numbers denote connection strengths (mean amplitude of PSPs measured at soma in mV) and connection probabilities (in
parentheses) according to (Thomson and Bannister, 2003). Right panel: the equivalent microcircuitry based upon the message passing scheme of the previous ﬁgure.
Here, we have placed the outcome prediction errors in superﬁcial layers to accommodate the strong descending (inhibitory) connections from superﬁcial to deep
layers. This presupposes that descending (interlaminar) projections disinhibit Layer 5 pyramidal cells that project to the medium spiny cells of the striatum (Arikuni
and Kubota, 1986). The computational assignments in this ﬁgure should be compared with the equivalent scheme for predictive coding in (Bastos et al., 2012). The
key diﬀerence is that superﬁcial excitatory (e.g., pyramidal) cells encode expectations of hidden states, as opposed to state prediction errors. This is because the
prediction error is encoded by their postsynaptic currents, as opposed to their depolarisation or ﬁring rates (see main text). The white circles correspond to the
Bayesian model average of state expectations, which are the red balls in the previous ﬁgures (and the inset). Black arrows denote excitatory intrinsic connections,
while red arrows are inhibitory. Blue arrows denote bottom-up of ascending extrinsic connections, while green arrows are top-down or descending (For interpretation
of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article).
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factors at the higher level.
It is now necessary to specify the contingencies and transitions among
hidden states in terms of the B parameters. There is a separate Bmatrix for
every hidden factor and policy. In this example, these matrices have a very
simple form: on any given trial, policies cannot change the sentence or
word. This means the corresponding B matrices are identity matrices. For
hidden locations, the B matrices simply encode a transition from the
current location to the location speciﬁed by the policy. Here the policies
were again very simple; namely, where one looks next (in a body and head
centred frame of reference at the ﬁrst and second levels respectively). For
simplicity, the preceding actions that constitute each policy were the ac-
tions actually selected. In more sophisticated setups, policies can include
diﬀerent sequences of actions; however here, the number of policies and
actions were the same. This means we do not have to worry about the
evidence the diﬀerent policies encoded by the variational free energy (as
in the right panel of Fig. 2). There were three policies or actions at the
second level; proceed to the next word or stop reading and make a cate-
gorical decision of happy or sad; resulting in right or wrong feedback.
Finally, the prior preferences encoded in the C parameters rendered
all outcomes equally preferred, with the exception of being wrong,
which was set at = −Cln 4τi( ) . In other words, the subject thought they
were ≈exp(4) 54 times less likely to be wrong than undecided or right.
This aversion to making mistakes ensures the subject does not solicit
feedback to resolve uncertainty about the category of the sentence. In
other words, the subject has to be relatively conﬁdent – after epistemic
foraging – about the underlying narrative before conﬁrming any in-
ference with feedback. Prior beliefs about ﬁrst level hidden states, en-
coded in the D parameters, told the subject they would start at the ﬁrst
quadrant of the ﬁrst word, with an equal probability of all sentences.
Because all six sentences began with either ﬂee or wait, the prior
probability over words was implicitly restricted to ﬂee or wait, with
equal probabilities of horizontal ﬂipping (because these priors do not
depend on the higher level). The horizontal ﬂipping corresponds to a
spatial transformation, under which the meaning of the word is in-
variant, much like a palindrome. Conversely, the subject had a strong
prior belief that there was no vertical ﬂipping. This (low-level feature)
transformation can be regarded as presenting words in upper or lower
case. The prior over vertical ﬂipping will become important later, when
we switch prior beliefs to make uppercase (vertically ﬂipped) stimuli
the prior default to introduce violations of (feature) expectations.
A heuristic motivation for including hidden factors like horizontal
ﬂipping appeals to the way that we factorise hidden causes of stimuli; in
other words, carve nature at its joints. The fact that we are capable of:
“raeding wrods with jubmled lettres” (Rayner et al., 2006),
suggests that horizontal ﬂipping can be represented in a way that is
conditionally independent of grapheme content.
This completes our speciﬁcation of the generative model. To simu-
late reading, the equations in Fig. 2 were integrated using 16 iterations
for each time point at each level. At the lowest level, an iteration is
assumed to take 16ms, so that each epoch or transition is about
256ms.1 This is the approximate frequency of saccadic eye movements
Fig. 4. Belief propagation and extrinsic connectivity. This schematic illustrates a putative mapping between expectations that are updated during belief updating and
recurrent interactions within the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamic loops. This ﬁgure is based upon the functional neuroanatomy described in (Jahanshahi et al., 2015),
which assigns motor updates to motor and premotor cortex projecting to the putamen; associative loops to prefrontal cortical projections to the caudate and limbic
loops to projections to the ventral striatum. The correspondence between the message passing implicit in belief propagation and the organisation of these loops is
remarkable; even down to the level of the sign (excitatory or inhibitory) of the neuronal connections. The striatum (caudate and putamen) and the subthalamic
nucleus (STN) receive inputs from many cortical and subcortical areas. The internal segment of the globus pallidus (GPi) constitutes the main output nucleus from the
basal ganglia. The basal ganglia are not only connected to motor areas (motor cortex, supplementary motor cortex, premotor cortex, cingulate motor area and frontal
eye ﬁelds) but also have connections with associative cortical areas. The basal ganglia nuclei have topologically organized motor, associative and limbic territories;
the posterior putamen is engaged in sensorimotor function, while the anterior putamen (or caudate) and the ventral striatum are involved in associative (cognitive)
and limbic (motivation and emotion) functions (Jahanshahi et al., 2015).
1 This is roughly the amount of time taken per iteration on a personal computer – to
less than an order of magnitude.
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(and indeed phonemic processing in auditory language processing),
meaning that the simulations covered a few seconds of simulated time.
The scheduling of updates in hierarchical models presents an inter-
esting issue. In principle, we could implement the belief updating
synchronously; enabling second level expectations to be informed by
ﬁrst level expectations as they accumulate evidence. Alternatively, we
could wait until the ﬁrst level convergences and update higher levels
asynchronously – so that the high-level waits until the lower level se-
quence completes before updating and providing (empirical) prior
constraints for the initial state at the lower level. We elected to illus-
trate the latter (asynchronous) updating, noting that alternative (syn-
chronous) schemes could be implemented and compared to empirical
neuronal responses. Asynchronous scheduling has the advantage of
computational simplicity, because it means each level can be integrated
or solved by the same routine (here, spm_MDP_VB_X.m). This means
that the sequence of posterior expectations following convergence at
one level can be passed as (probabilistic) outcomes to the next, while
the outcomes from the highest level enter as prior constraints on the
initial states of the level below. Furthermore, we will see below that the
ensuing updates bear a marked similarity to empirical (neurophysio-
logical) responses.
Fig. 6 shows simulated behavioural responses during reading in
terms of eye movements (upper panel) over four transitions at the
second level, where each transition entails one or two saccades at the
ﬁrst. In this exemplar simulation, the stimuli were generated at random
using the above generative model. Here, the subject read the ﬁrst
sentence in lower case, apart from the second letter that was in upper
case (i.e. with a surprising vertical ﬂipping). In this trial, the subject
looks at the ﬁrst quadrant of the ﬁrst word and sees a cat. She therefore
knows immediately that the ﬁrst word is ﬂee. She then turns to the
second word and sees nothing. To resolve uncertainty, she samples the
fourth quadrant and again ﬁnds nothing, which means this word must
be wait (because the second word of each sentence is either ﬂee or wait –
and the current word cannot be ﬂee because the cat cannot be next to
the bird). The next two saccades, on the subsequent word, conﬁrm the
word feed (with the seed next to the seed sampled on the ﬁrst saccade).
Finally, the subject turns to the ﬁnal word and discovers seeds on the
second saccade. At this point, residual uncertainty about the sentence is
resolved and the subject makes a correct categorisation – a happy story.
The lower panel shows expected outcomes at the end of sampling each
word. The upper row shows the ﬁnal beliefs about the words under
(correct) expectations about the sentence of the second level. This (ﬁrst)
sentence was “ﬂee, wait, feed and wait”.
The key thing to take from these results is that the agent can have
precise beliefs about letters without ever seeing them. For example, the
subject believes there is a bird in the second quadrant of the ﬁrst word,
despite the fact she never looked there. This illustrates the fact that it is
not necessary to sample all the constituent letters to identify a word.
Fig. 5. The generative model used to simulate reading. This graphical model shows the conditional dependencies of the generative model used in subsequent ﬁgures,
using the same format as Fig. 1. In this model there are two hierarchical levels with three hidden states at the second level and four at the ﬁrst level (hidden states and
outcomes pertaining to categorical decisions and feedback have been omitted for clarity). The hidden states at the higher level correspond to the sentence or narrative
– generating sequences of words at the ﬁrst level – and which word the agent is currently sampling (with six alternative sentences and four words respectively). These
(higher level) hidden states combine to specify the word generated at the ﬁrst level (ﬂee, feed or wait). The hidden states at the ﬁrst level comprise the current word
and which quadrant the agent is looking at. These hidden states combine to generate outcomes in terms of letters or icons that would be sampled if the agent looked at
a particular location in the current word. In addition, two further hidden states provide a local feature context by ﬂipping the locations vertically or horizontally. The
vertical ﬂip can be thought of in terms of font substitution (upper case versus lowercase), while the horizontal ﬂip means a word is invariant under changes to the
order of the letters (c.f., palindromes that read the same backwards as forwards). In this example, ﬂee means that a bird is next to a cat, feed means a bird is next to
some seeds and wait means seeds are above (or below) the bird. Notice that there are outcomes at both levels. At the higher level there is a (proprioceptive) outcome
signalling the word currently being sampled (e.g., head position), while at the lower level there are two outcome modalities. The ﬁrst (exteroceptive) outcome
corresponds to the observed letter and the second (proprioceptive) outcome reports the letter location (e.g., direction of gaze in a head-centred frame of reference).
Similarly, there are policies at both levels. The high-level policy determines which word the agent is currently reading, while the lower level dictates the transitions
among the quadrants containing letters.
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Conversely, there can be uncertainty about particular letters, even
though the subject is conﬁdent about the word. This is illustrated by the
expectations about the letters in the second word. These expectations
are consistent with wait but reﬂect a degree of uncertainty about the
vertical ﬂip (i.e., lower case or upper case font). This uncertainty – and
resulting hesitancy in moving to the next word – reﬂects the subject’s
prior belief that letters are usually presented in lower case. However,
the actual stimuli were presented in a surprising way (with a vertical
ﬂip) that causes the subject to spend an extra saccade on this word,
before moving to the next.
Fig. 7 shows the simulated electrophysiological responses associated
with the belief updating reported in Fig. 6. Expectations about the
hidden state at the higher (upper panel) and lower (middle panel) levels
are presented in raster format. The horizontal axis is time over the
entire trial, where each iteration corresponds roughly to 16ms and the
trial lasted for three and half seconds. The vertical axis corresponds to
the Bayesian model averages or expectations about the six sentences at
the higher level and the three words at the lower level. Under the
scheduling used in these simulations, higher level expectations wait
until lower-level updates have terminated and, reciprocally, lower-level
updates are suspended until belief updating in the higher level has been
completed. This means the expectations are sustained at the higher
level, while the lower level gathers information. The resulting patterns
of ﬁring rate over time show a marked resemblance to pre-saccadic
delay period activity in the prefrontal cortex. The insert on the upper
right is based upon the empirical results reported in (Funahashi, 2014)
and tie in nicely with the putative role of matrix thalamocortical pro-
jections during delay period activity (Cruikshank et al., 2012). Note
that the expectations are reset at the beginning of each epoch, produ-
cing the transients in the lower panel on the left. These ﬂuctuations are
the ﬁring rate in the upper panels ﬁltered between 4 Hz and 32 Hz and
can be regarded as (band pass ﬁltered) changes in simulated depolar-
isation. These simulated local ﬁeld potentials are again remarkably si-
milar to empirical responses. The examples shown in the lower right
inset are based on the study of perisaccadic electrophysiological re-
sponses in early and inferotemporal cortex during active vision reported
in (Purpura et al., 2003).
4.1. Summary
In the previous section, we highlighted the biological plausibility of
belief updating based upon deep temporal models. In this section, the
biological plausibility is further endorsed in terms of canonical elec-
trophysiological phenomena such as perisaccadic delay period ﬁring
activity and local ﬁeld potentials. Furthermore, these simulations have
a high degree of face validity in terms of saccadic eye movements
during reading (Rayner, 1978, 2009). In the ﬁnal section, we focus on
the electrophysiological correlates and try to reproduce classical event
related potential phenomena such as the mismatch negativity and other
responses to violation.
5. Simulations of classical violation responses
Fig. 8 shows simulated electrophysiological correlates of peri-
saccadic responses after the last saccade prior to the decision epoch,
when the subject declared her choice (in this case happy). To char-
acterise responses to violations of local and global expectations, we
repeated the simulations using exactly the same stimuli and actions but
under diﬀerent prior beliefs. Our hope here was to reproduce the
classical mismatch negativity (MMN) response to unexpected (local)
stimulus features (Strauss et al., 2015) – and a subsequent P300 (or
N400) response to semantic (global) violations (Donchin and Coles,
1988). These distinct violation responses are important correlates of
attentional processing and, clinically, conscious level and psycho-
pathology (Morlet and Fischer, 2014; Light et al., 2015).
To simulate local (word or lexical) violations, we reversed the prior
expectation of an upper case by switching the priors on the vertical ﬂip
for, and only for the last word. This produced greater excursions in the
dynamics of belief updating. These can be seen as slight diﬀerences
between the normal response (dotted lines) and response under local
violations (solid lines) in the upper left panel of Fig. 8. The lower-level
(lexical) expectations are shown in blue, while high-level (contextual)
expectations are shown in red. Belief updating at the lower-level pro-
duces a ﬂuctuation at around 100ms known as an N1 response in ERP
research. In contrast to these early (a.k.a. exogenous) responses, later
(a.k.a. endogenous) responses appear to be dominated by expectations
at the higher level. The diﬀerence waveforms (with and without sur-
prising stimulus features) are shown on the upper right panel and look
remarkably like a classical mismatch negativity. Note that the mismatch
negativity peaks at about 170ms and slightly postdates the N1. Again,
this is exactly what is observed empirically; leading to debates about
whether the generators of the N1 and MMM are the same or diﬀerent.
These simulations oﬀer a deﬁnitive answer: the generators (neuronal
encoding of expectations) are exactly the same; however, evidence
accumulation is slightly slower when expectations are violated –
leading to a protracted diﬀerence waveform.
To emulate global violations, we decreased the prior probability of
the inferred (ﬁrst) sentence by a factor of eight. This global (semantic)
violation rendered the sampled word relatively surprising, producing a
diﬀerence waveform with more protracted dynamics. Again, this is
remarkably similar to empirical P300 responses seen with contextual
Fig. 6. Simulated behavioural responses during reading: upper panel. This
shows the trajectory of eye movements over four transitions at the second level
that entail one or two saccadic eye movements at the ﬁrst. In this trial, the
subject looks at the ﬁrst quadrant of the ﬁrst word and sees a cat. She therefore
knows immediately that the ﬁrst word is ﬂee. She then turns to the ﬁrst
quadrant of the second word and sees nothing. To resolve uncertainty she then
looks at the fourth quadrant and again ﬁnds nothing, which means this word
must be wait (because the second word of each sentence is either ﬂee or wait –
and the current word cannot be ﬂee because the cat cannot be next to the bird).
The next two saccades, on the subsequent word conﬁrm the word feed (with the
seed next to the bird sampled on the ﬁrst saccade). Finally, the subject turns to
the ﬁnal word and discloses seeds after the second saccade. At this point, un-
certainty about the sentence (sentence one versus sentence four) is resolved and
the subject makes a correct categorisation – a happy story. Lower panel: this
panel shows expected outcomes at the end of sampling each word. The upper
row shows the ﬁnal beliefs about the words under (correct) expectations about
the sentence at the second level. This (ﬁrst) sentence was “ﬂee, wait, feed and
wait”. At the ﬁrst level, expectations about the letters under posterior beliefs
about the words are shown in terms of mixtures of icons.
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violations. It is well known that the amplitude of the P300 component is
inversely related to the probability of stimuli (Donchin and Coles,
1988). The anterior P3a is generally evoked by stimuli that deviate
from expectations. Indeed, novel stimuli generate a higher-amplitude
P3a component than deviant but repeated stimuli. The P3b is a late
positive component with a parietal (posterior) distribution seen in
oddball paradigms and is thought to represent a context-updating op-
eration (Donchin and Coles, 1988; Morlet and Fischer, 2014). Here, this
context is operationalised in terms of changes in (sentence) context,
under which lexical features are accumulated.
Finally, we combined the local and global priors to examine the
interaction between local and global violations in terms of the diﬀer-
ence of diﬀerence waveforms. The results are shown on the lower right
and suggest that the eﬀect of a global violation on the eﬀects of a local
violation (and vice versa) look similar to the mismatch negativity. This
means, that the eﬀect of a local violation on a global violation is
manifest as an increase in the amplitude of mismatch negativity and the
positive P300 diﬀerences. Interestingly, this interaction appears to be
restricted to low (lexical) representations. This suggests that, empiri-
cally, a late peak P300 like response to global violations may appear to
be generated by sources normally associated with mismatch negativity
(e.g., a shift to more anterior sources of the sort that deﬁne the P3a).
5.1. Summary
The opportunity to simulate these classical waveforms rests upon
having a computationally and neurophysiologically plausible process
theory that accommodates notions of violations and expectations.
Happily, this is exactly the sort of framework oﬀered by active in-
ference. The MMN and P300 are particularly interesting from the point
of view of clinical research and computational psychiatry (Montague
et al., 2012). Indeed, their use in schizophrenia research (Umbricht and
Fig. 7. Simulated electrophysiological responses during reading: these panels show the Bayesian belief updating that underlies the behaviour and expectations
reported in the previous ﬁgure. Expectations about the initial hidden state (at the ﬁrst time step) at the higher (upper panel A) and lower (middle panel B)
hierarchical levels are presented in raster format, where an expectation of one corresponds to black (i.e., the ﬁring rate activity corresponds to image intensity). The
horizontal axis is time over the entire trial, where each iteration corresponds roughly to 16ms. The vertical axis corresponds to the six sentences at the higher level
and the three words at the lower level. The resulting patterns of ﬁring rate over time show a marked resemblance to delay period activity in the prefrontal cortex prior
to saccades. Saccade onsets are shown with the vertical (cyan) lines. The inset on the upper right is based upon the empirical results reported in (Funahashi, 2014).
The transients in the lower panel (C) are the ﬁring rates in the upper panels ﬁltered between 4 Hz and 32 Hz – and can be regarded as (band pass ﬁltered) ﬂuctuations
in depolarisation. These simulated local ﬁeld potentials are again remarkably similar to empirical responses. The examples shown in the inset are based on the study
of perisaccadic electrophysiological responses during activation reported in (Purpura et al., 2003). The upper traces come from early visual cortex (V2), while the
lower traces come from inferotemporal cortex (TE). These can be thought of as ﬁrst and second level empirical responses respectively. The lower panel (D) reproduces
the eye movement trajectories of the previous ﬁgure. The simulated electrophysiological responses highlighted in cyan are characterised in more detail in the next
ﬁgure.
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Krljes, 2005; Wang and Krystal, 2014; Light et al., 2015) was a partial
motivation for the work reported in this paper.
6. Discussion
This paper has introduced the form and variational inversion of
deep (hierarchical) temporal models for discrete (Markovian) hidden
states and outcomes. This form of modelling has been important in
machine learning; e.g. (Neﬁan et al., 2002; George and Hawkins, 2009),
with a special focus on hierarchical or deep architectures
(Salakhutdinov et al., 2013; Zorzi et al., 2013; Testolin and Zorzi,
2016). The technical contribution of this work is a formal treatment of
discrete time in a hierarchical (nested or deep) setting and a simple set
of belief update rules that follow from minimising variational free en-
ergy. Furthermore, this minimisation is contextualised within active
inference to generate purposeful (epistemic and pragmatic) behaviour
based on planning as inference (Botvinick and Toussaint, 2012).
The inference scheme presented here takes a potentially important
step in explaining hierarchical temporal behaviour and how it may be
orchestrated by the brain. There are a number of directions in which the
scope of hierarchical schemes of the sort could be expanded. Firstly, to
fully capture the dynamic character of language comprehension and
production, means one has to handle systems of compositional re-
cursive rules (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988; Pinker and Ullman, 2002),
that underlie language grammars (Chomsky, 2006). This is likely to
require deeper generative models that may entail some structure
learning or nonparametric Bayesian methods (MacKay and Peto, 1995;
Goldwater, 2006; Gershman and Niv, 2010; Collins and Frank, 2013).
Secondly, there are subtle aspects to processing of serial order that have
been identiﬁed and modelled (Page and Norris, 1998; Burgess and
Hitch, 1999; Brown et al., 2000; Botvinick and Plaut, 2006). For ex-
ample, without additional mechanisms, associative chaining models –
in which chains are constructed with one-to-one dependencies between
items – have diﬃculty modelling repetition (Lashley, 1951). This is
because dependencies from an item typically change when it is re-
peated, requiring context dependent mechanisms to be added. The
types-tokens framework (Kanwisher, 1987, Bowman and Wyble, 2007)
may be a particularly useful way to handle repetition. In addition to
repetitions, error patterns in serial order recall seem inconsistent with a
vanilla associative chaining model (Henson, 1998; Page and Norris,
1998). In further work on the deep temporal model presented here, we
will explore extensions that enable language grammars and classic se-
rial order recall data to be simulated.
From a neurobiological perspective, the belief updating appears to
be suﬃciently simple to be biologically plausible; resting on simple
operators such as softmax functions, logarithmic transforms and linear
algebra (that can be implemented using ﬁring rate functions, nonlinear
postsynaptic responses and neuronal connectivity respectively).
Furthermore, the intrinsic and extrinsic connectivity required by the
belief propagation appears to map gracefully to intrinsic and extrinsic
connectivity within canonical microcircuits – and in the cortical-basal
ganglia-thalamic loops responsible for action selection in the brain. The
computational architecture that emerges from applying standard (var-
iational) Bayesian belief updating to hierarchical models relates ob-
servable neuronal dynamics to underlying computational processes; an
approach that might be applicable to temporally structured neurophy-
siological responses across diﬀerent measurements and cognitive do-
mains (Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2006; Hasson et al., 2008; Cocchi
et al., 2016). Finally, the biological plausibility of the resulting scheme
acquires a predictive validity; in the sense that it reproduces some
speciﬁc violation responses studied in state-of-the-art cognitive neu-
roscience (Strauss et al., 2015; Uhrig et al., 2016).
Software note
Although the generative model – speciﬁed by the A B , D( , , C ) ma-
trices – changes from application to application, the belief updates in
Fig. 2 are generic and can be implemented using standard routines
(here spm_MDP_VB_X.m). These routines are available as Matlab code
in the SPM academic software: http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/. The
simulations in this paper can be reproduced (and customised) via a
graphical user interface: by typing DEM and selecting the reading
demo.
Fig. 8. Simulated electrophysiological responses to violations: these simulated
electrophysiological correlates focus on the perisaccadic responses around the
last saccade prior to the ﬁnal epoch, i.e. the cyan region highlighted in Fig. 7.
The blue lines report the (ﬁltered) expectations over peristimulus time at the ﬁrst
level (with one line for each of the three words), while the red lines show the
evolution of expectations at the second level (with one line for each of the six
sentences). Here, we repeated the simulations using the same stimuli and actions
but under diﬀerent prior beliefs. First, we reversed the prior expectation of a
lower case by switching the informative priors on the vertical ﬂip for, and only
for, the last word. This means that the stimuli violated local expectations, pro-
ducing slightly greater excursions in the dynamics of belief updating. These can
be seen in slight diﬀerences between the normal standard response (dotted line)
and the response to the surprising letter (solid lines) in the upper left panel. The
ensuing diﬀerence waveform is shown on the upper right panel and looks re-
markably like the classical mismatch negativity. Second, we made the inferred
sentence surprising by decreasing its prior probability by a factor of eight. This
global violation rendered the sampled word relatively surprising, producing a
diﬀerence waveform with more protracted dynamics. Again, this is remarkably
similar to empirical P300 responses seen with global violations. Finally, we
combined the local and global priors to examine the interaction between local
and global violations in terms of the diﬀerence in diﬀerence waveforms (these
are not the diﬀerences in the diﬀerence waveforms above, which are referenced
to the same normal response). The results are shown on the lower right and
suggest that the eﬀect of a global violation on the eﬀects of a local violation (and
vice versa) is largely restricted to early responses. The insert illustrates empirical
event related potentials to unexpected stimuli elicited in patients with altered
levels of consciousness to illustrate the form of empirical MMN and P300 re-
sponses (Fischer et al., 2000) (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article).
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Appendices
These appendices are provided for readers who are interested in technical details. In particular, they provide the derivations behind the (Matlab)
implementation of active inference for Markov decision processes used to illustrate reading in this paper. A more detailed description of the update
schemes can be found in the annot ated (Matlab) routines that are freely available as academic software.
Appendix 1
Belief updating: Bayesian inference is equivalent to maximising the marginal likelihood – or minimising variational free energy – with respect to
beliefs (here, expectations) about hidden or latent variables. Free energy is essentially the diﬀerence between complexity and accuracy. The free
energy for the generative model in Fig. 1 can be expressed as follows (ignoring constants):
(A.1)
The (marginal) free energy of N hidden factors at the i-th level, under the π-th policy, is given by its path integral (see Appendix 2):
(A.2)Eq. (A.2) expresses free energy as an expected prediction error, where the prediction error is the log expectation of the hidden state minus the
prediction from its Markov blanket; namely, the previous state, the next state and other factors at the current time (i.e., parents of the current
outcome). For the ﬁrst hidden state, the prediction from the previous state is replaced by the prediction from the hierarchical level above;
≡ +B s D sπi n πi n i n i,0( , ) ,0( , ) ( , ) ( 1). For simplicity, we have omitted the time subscript for expected states at the higher level and have assumed a single outcome
modality and a single higher-level factor.
The expected free energy of a policy (see Appendix 3) has the same form as (A.2), now allowing for M multiple outcome modalities:
(A.3)
The updates for expectations of hidden states can now be formulated as a gradient descent on free energy, while policy expectations minimises
free energy explicitly (ignoring constants):
(A.4)
Here, −τs( ) i1( 1) denotes the expected initial state in the lower level during epoch τ at the higher level. Note that the prediction error is simply the free
energy gradient with respect to each hidden state. This means that optimising free energy through a gradient descent corresponds to destroying free
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energy gradients (Tschacher and Haken, 2007).
Appendix 2
Marginal free energy lemma: the variational free energy in (A.2) has been formulated a slightly unusual way to ﬁnesse the overconﬁdence problem
that attends mean ﬁeld approximations. Minimising this marginal free energy, with respect to the approximate posterior, yields the true posterior by
the following lemma:
Lemma (marginal free energy): under a mean ﬁeld approximation = ∏Q s Q( ) i i( ), the marginal free energy F i( ) is minimised when the approx-
imate posteriors becomes the true marginal posteriors, at which point (negative) free energy becomes log evidence:
(A.5)
Proof: when the approximate posterior is equal to the true posterior, marginalisation over the Markov blanket of any hidden state returns its true
posterior and the divergence attains its minimum of zero
(A.6)
This means the free energy reduces to the log evidence □.
Remarks: to ﬁnesse the problem that we do not have an explicit joint posterior over the Markov blanket, one can replace the complexity based
upon the joint posterior with the sum of complexities based upon the marginal posteriors – based upon the assumption that they share the same
minimum.
(A.7)
In practice, this appears to oﬀer robust convergence. This leads to the marginal free energy in (A.3) in which the complexity can be separated into
prior constraints from the parents and children of states at any point in time (that can be construed of in terms of a forward and backwards
complexity).
Appendix 3
Expected free energy: variational free energy is a functional of a distribution over states, given observed outcomes. We can express this as a
function of the suﬃcient statistics of the posterior:
(A.8)
In contrast, the expected free energy is the average over (unobserved) outcomes, given some policy that determines the distribution over states.
This can be expressed as a function of the policy:
(A.9)
The expected free energy is therefore just the expected entropy or uncertainty about outcomes under a particular policy. Things get more
interesting if we express the generative model-terms of a prior over outcomes that does not depend upon the policy
(A.10)
In this setting, the expected uncertainty or ambiguity is supplemented with a risk that scores the diﬀerence between the prior (preferred)
outcomes and outcomes under a particular policy. This is the form used in active inference, where all the probabilities in (A.10) are conditioned upon
past observations. This enables one to replace the posterior in (A.10) with the approximate posterior that minimises variational free energy based on
(observed) outcomes in the past.
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